




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































highlighting% previous% research% from% psychology% and% computer% science.% Three% core%
theoretical% approaches% are% considered% in% addressing% the% issue% of% individual%



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































%This% chapter% reports% findings% from% three% initial% exploratory% experiments,%
which% aimed% to% elicit% insight% on% participants’% personal% experiences% of% fraud.% Study%
one% describes% qualitative% data% from% a% number% of% focus% group% discussions,% which%
highlight% a% limited% understanding% of% more% sophisticated% phishing% attacks% and% a%
tendency% to% rely% on% outSdated% cues% in% spotting% fraud.% Study% two% provides% further%


















































































































































































































Yes% 46% 71% 29%










































































Yes% 96% 9% 11% 0% 40% 7%


























Response% Mean% SD% Mean% SD% Mean% SD% Mean% SD%
Yes% 35.14% 8.23% 1.14% 1.07% 27.50% 9.20% 1.00% 1.41%

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































% % Age% Age%group% Gender%
Open%day% N% Mean% SD% Student% Parent% Male%% Female%
1% 145% 31.73% 16.65% 79% 63% 34% 101%
2%and%3% 145% 32.56% 16.15% 71% 65% 41% 92%



















































































































































































































































































































previous% fraud% research,% or% related% research% from% fields% such% as% risky% decisionS
making,%and%will%provide%an% initial% insight% into%how%the%cognitive%makeSup%of%a%user%
might% predict% susceptibility.% Using% an% email% legitimacy% task,% developed% for% the%
purpose%of%the%experiment,%three%cognitive%variables%were%highlighted%as%predictors%
of% accuracy% in% differentiating% between% phishing% and% legitimate% email.% These% were:%
cognitive% reflection,% inhibition,% and% sensation% seeking.% In% addition% to% this,% a% time%
pressure%manipulation%was%included%as%part%of%the%email%task,%with%some%participants%
given% a% limited% amount% of% time% to% complete% the% task.% Results% demonstrated% that%









































































































































































































































































































































































































































% % % %
Definitely%
legitimate%
% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
Phishing%emails% 3% 2% 1% S1% S2% S3%





































































































% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
1.%No.%Correct% 1.00% % % % % % %
2.%No.%phishing%correct% .46**% 1.00% % % % % %
3.%No.%legitimate%correct% .61**% S.43**% 1.00% % % % %
4.%Confidence%score% .94**% .50**% .51**% 1.00% % % %
5.%Confidence%score%on%
phishing%
.45**% .91**% S.36**% .58**% 1.00% % %
6.%Confidence%score%on%
legitimate%
.53**% S.35**% .85**% .57**% S.18**% 1.00% %


























































0.4% 30.8% 50.4% 18.3% 0%






68.8% 28.6% 1.8% 0.9% 0%























Cognitive%measure% N% Mean% SD%




%%%%%Extraversion% 120% 32.35% 7.67%
%%%%%Agreeableness% 120% 40.58% 6.00%
%%%%%Conscientiousness% 120% 33.87% 6.54%
%%%%%Neuroticism% 120% 29.63% 8.66%
%%%%%Intellect% 120% 36.03% 5.29%
Flanker%test% 101% 4.58% 104.77%
























































































































































































































































































































































































































& Number&correct& Confidence&score& D8prime&
Cognitive&reflection&test&& .31**& .25*& .28**&
Flanker&test& .23*& .25*& .20*&
Agreeableness& 8.13& 8.18& 8.14&









Cognitive&measure& N& Mean& SD&
Self8control& 97& 38.87& 8.33&
Sensation&seeking& 97& 3.19& 0.74&
Stroop&task& 99& 93.81& 77.28&













& 1& 2& 3& 4& 5& 6& 7&
1.&No&correct& 1.00& & & & & & &
2.&Confidence&score& .95**& 1.00& & & & & &
3.&D8prime& .98**& .93**& 1.00& & & & &
4.&Self8control&score& .09& .08& .08& 1.00& & & &
5.&Sensation8seeking&score& 8.23*& 8.20*& 8.21*& 8.11& 1.00& & &
6.&Stroop&test& .02& .01& .00& 8.00& 8.08& 1.00& &













& Number&correct& Confidence&score& D8prime&
Sensation&seeking&score& 80.23*& 80.20*& 80.17&

































































































































































































of& the& email& task.& Findings& demonstrated& that& performance& across& both& varied&















































































































































































































Stimuli&condition& Mean& SD& Mean& SD&
Majority&phishing& 23.08& 4.38& 25.27& 21.11&
Majority&legitimate& 22.31& 5.06& 20.80& 25.15&




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the& email& legitimacy& task,& providing& qualitative& data& about& the& cues& and& heuristics&
that& participants& rely& upon&when&making& decisions& regarding& email& legitimacy.& The&
cognitive& reflection& test& and& Moses& illusion& were& also& included& in& this& study& to&
provide&concurrent&evidence&of&effects& reported&earlier& in& the&thesis.&Findings& from&
the& think8aloud& data& demonstrate& a& reliance& on& basic,& out8dated& cues& in& judging&
email& legitimacy,& as& well& as& highlighting& the& persuasive& power& of& factors& such& as&
familiarity&and&email&relevance.&These&are&valuable&insights&that&may&help&to&inform&
efforts&to&educate&users&and&reduce&susceptibility.&The&Moses& illusion&was&found&to&






































use& of& spoofed& email& addresses,& this& still& seems& fairly& limited.& In& addition,& there&
appears& to&be& little&psychological&evidence& to&demonstrate&whether&advice& such&as&
this&is&successful&in&helping&users&to&detect&phishing&emails.&A&key&aim&of&this&study&is&
to&establish& the&extent& to&which&users&are& reliant&on&out8dated&cues&such&as& these,&

























































































































































































































& 1& 2& 3& 4& 5& 6&
1.&Number&correct& 1.00& & & & & &
2.&Phishing&correct& .23& 1.00& & & & &
3.&Legitimate&correct& .77**& 8.44**& 1.00& & & &
4.&Confidence&score& .91**& .24& .68**& 1.00& & &
5.&Phishing&confidence& .20& .82**& 8.35*& .40**& 1.00& &



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tasks,& regardless& of& complexity.& The& cognitive& reflection& test& was& found& to& be& a&


























































































































































































































































































Condition& Mean& SD& Mean& SD&
Control& 24.83& 4.33& 35.83& 19.56&
Simple&verbal& 20.95& 4.60& 16.67& 23.55&
Complex&verbal& 20.62& 3.94& 16.43& 20.76&
Simple&motor& 25.26& 3.72& 35.68& 19.13&




















































































































































































































































































































be& predictive& in& Study& 3& were& included& here& to& assess& whether& findings& were&
replicated& with& a& potentially& more& ecologically& valid& measure& of& susceptibility.&
Additional&situational&factors,& including&time&pressure,&email&relevance,&and&priming&
about& phishing& emails,& were& also& manipulated& to& assess& how& these& influenced&

























































































































































































































































































































































































































& N& Recognised&as&phishing& Irrelevant&to&study/&tasks&
Email&1& 6& 83.3& 16.7&
Email&2& 3& 33.3& 66.7&
Email&3& 4& 50.0& 50.0&
Email&4& 3& 33.3& 66.7&




















Email&1& 92.2& 64.7& 5.9& 9.8& 10.2&
Email&2& 92.2& 45.1& 9.8& 5.9& 2.0&
Email&3& 92.2& 27.5& 0.0& 11.8& 4.1&
Email&4& 94.1& 47.1& 3.9& 7.8& 2.0&
Email&5& 68.6& 5.9& 0.0& 19.6& 16.3&
&
Table&8.4!Correlations!between!response!types!to!phishing!emails!
& 1& 2& 3& 4& 5&
1.&Opened& 1.00& & & & &
2.&Clicked& .45**& 1.00& & & &
3.&Replied& .07& .18& 1.00& & &
4.&Deleted& 8.39**& .00& 8.12& 1.00& &



















































































































Cognitive&measure& N& Mean& SD&
Cognitive&reflection&test& 49& 1.20& 1.17&
Flanker&task& 37& 11.35& 38.08&
Brief&self8control&scale& 49& 37.45& 6.57&











& 1& 2& 3& 4& 5& 6& 7& 8&
1.&Opened& 1.00& & & & & & & &
2.&Clicked& .45**& 1.00& & & & & & &
3.&Replied& .07& .18& 1.00& & & & & &
4.&Deleted& 8.39**& .00& 8.12& 1.00& & & & &
5.&Recognised& 8.71**& 8.35*& 8.18& .57**& 1.00& & & &
6.&CRT&Score& 8.36*& 8.02& .01& .34*& .29*& 1.00& & &
7.&Flanker& 8.02& 8.02& .07& .07& 8.08& .01& 1.00& &
8.&BSCS&Scale& .19& .01& 8.01& 8.24& 8.21& 8.11& 8.25& 1.00&












& Opened& Clicked& Replied& Deleted& Recognised&
CRT&Score& 8.34*& 8.23& 8& .34*& .28&
Flanker& 8& 8& .07& 8& 8&
BSCS&Scale& .18& 8& 8& 8.21& 8.20&
BSS&Scale& 8& .19& 8& .32*& 8&

































































































































































































































































































































This& chapter& provides& an& overview& of& the& key& findings& from& the& thesis,&
highlighting& aspects& of& email& content,& cognitive& processing,& and& cognitive&make8up&
that&were&found&to&affect&performance&in&measures&of&susceptibility&to&email&fraud.&
The&practical&applications&of&these&findings&are&outlined,&with&particular&emphasis&on&
how& findings&might&be&used& to& enhance&efforts& to& educate& and&protect& users& from&
victimisation.&Limitations& to& the& research&conducted& in& the& thesis&are&also&outlined.&




































































































































Exp.& N! Mean&accuracy& SD& Mean&confidence& SD&
3& 224& 24.57& 3.43& 33.08& 17.14&
4& 98& 22.69& 4.73& 23.03& 23.21&
4a& 60& 22.48& 5.28& 21.90& 27.24&
5& 51& 26.84& 3.18& 47.41& 16.94&




Exp.& 3& 4& 4a& 5&
4& 81.88**& & & &
4a& 82.09**& 80.21& & &
5& 2.27**& 4.15***& 4.36***& &
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Consistent(findings(across(the(studies(in(the(thesis(demonstrated(that(factors(relating(
to(an(ability(to(suppress(an(impulsive(response(to(a(problem(were(found(to(predict(
higher(accuracy(on(the(email(legitimacy(task.(In(line(with(this,(consideration(of(
situational(influences(suggests(that(attempts(to(make(decisions(about(email(
legitimacy(whilst(under(increased(cognitive(load(could(be(detrimental(to(accuracy.(
These(differences(both(within(participants(in(different(situations,(and(between(
participants(who(demonstrate(different(cognitive(abilities,(may(be(explained(by(the(
cognitive(strategies(employed(in(decision>making.((
One(explanation(for(the(differences(demonstrated(may(come(from(dual>
system(theories(of(reasoning.(These(propose(that(some(users(are(consistently(better(
able(to(engage(more(rational,(system(2(strategies(for(decision>making(whilst(others(
rely(more(heavily(on(impulsive,(system(1(strategies,(leading(to(more(systematic(
errors((Tversky(&(Kahneman,(1975).(Rational(decision>making(is(known(to(relate(to(a(
higher(working(memory(capacity((Kyllonen(&(Christal,(1990;(Markovits,(Doyon,(&(
Simoneau,(2002),(and(this(in(turn(has(been(linked(to(inhibitory(capacity((Engle,(1996;(
Redick,(Heitz,(&(Engle,(2007).(The(findings(reported(in(this(thesis(would(suggest(that(
when(a(user’s(inhibitory(capacity(is(limited(>(that(is,(they(are(unable(to(suppress(an(
impulsive(response(>(ability(to(see(past(an(intuitive(response(regarding(email(
legitimacy(is(also(limited.(Such(users(may(consistently(overlook(cues(that(identify(an(
email(as(suspicious(as(they(do(not(process(all(information(available(to(them(or(
consider(the(negative(consequences(of(a(decision(to(respond(in(an(impulsive(
manner.(Study(5(provides(support(for(this(explanation,(with(qualitative(data(
demonstrating(that(some(users(were(consistently(reliant(on(a(single(cue(to(
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legitimacy,(whilst(others(spent(time(contemplating(numerous(aspects(of(the(
information(available(to(them(when(judging(each(email(stimuli.((
At(the(same(time,(the(decision>making(process(can(be(influenced(by(
situational(factors(that(mean(users,(who(might(otherwise(have(engaged(in(more(
rational(processing,(are(reliant(on(an(impulsive(response.(The(thesis(showed(
evidence(of(impaired(accuracy(in(email(decision>making(when(participants(were(
under(induced(time(constraints,(or(their(attention(was(divided(between(multiple(
tasks.(This(supports(previous(research(demonstrating(that(participants(demonstrate(
increased(susceptibility(to(phishing(emails(when(they(are(reliant(on(intuitive(
responses((Yan(&(Gozu,(2012;(Harrison(et(al.,(2016).(Situational(influences(on(
susceptibility(may(also(be(related(to(ability(to(divide(attention.(In(particular,(the(
finding(that(participant(accuracy(is(impaired(whilst(completing(a(secondary(verbal(
task,(may(demonstrate(the(negative(impact(of(trying(to(divide(attention(between(
multiple(tasks(at(once.(This(has(practical(implications,(discussed(in(more(detail(
below,(for(the(impact(that(multi>tasking(behaviours(such(as(this(can(have(on(
susceptibility.((
Although(the(level(of(variance(in(email(task(performance(explained(by(these(
factors(remains(relatively(low(across(experiments,(the(replication(of(findings(with(
alternative(methodologies(demonstrates(that(they(provide(a(solid(grounding(for(
establishing(a(more(substantial(explanation(of(email(fraud(victimisation(in(future(
research.((
(
9.7.2%Methodological%contributions.(In(addition(to(the(insights(into(
individual(differences(in(email(fraud(susceptibility,(the(thesis(employed(a(mixed(
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methods(approach,(demonstrating(the(value(of(a(number(of(research(paradigms(to(
the(assessment(of(email(fraud(susceptibility.(Incorporating(both(quantitative(and(
qualitative(data(collection(methods(allowed(for(alternative(approaches(to(addressing(
the(aims(of(the(thesis(and(considering(different(aspects(of(susceptibility.(Whilst(the(
quantitative(data(provide(evidence(of(relationships(between(cognitive(factors(and(
situational(influences(in(email(decision>making,(the(qualitative(data(provide(a(
complementary(source(of(evidence,(which(also(considers(the(effect(of(different(
persuasive(techniques(employed(in(the(emails(themselves.(As(well(as(the(different(
types(of(data(collected,(the(methods(used(varied(across(the(experiments.(Methods(
that(have(not(previously(been(used(in(relation(to(email(fraud(susceptibility(were(
employed,(such(as(focus(group(discussions,(dual>task(paradigms,(reliability(analysis,(
and(an(office(simulation(experiment.(The(use(of(different(methodologies(provided(
opportunity(to(assess(susceptibility(and(factors(influencing(this(under(a(number(of(
different(circumstances.(Convergent(findings(across(these(different(methodologies(
suggest(more(robust(findings(regarding(individual(differences(in(cognitive(make>up(
between(users,(as(well(as(situational(factors(influencing(email(decision>making.((
In(addition(to(the(methods(employed(to(assess(factors(influencing(the(
decision>making(process,(this(thesis(has(also(contributed(two(novel(measures(of(
susceptibility.(The(email(legitimacy(task(provides(a(practical,(ethically(sound(
methodology(that(can(be(administered(either(in(the(lab(or(online.(Although(there(are(
a(number(of(limitations(to(this(methodology(as(a(measure(of(susceptibility,(it(allows(
flexibility(in(terms(of(additional(manipulations(that(can(be(administered,(and(
variations(in(the(exact(stimuli(included.(Although(the(findings(regarding(test>retest(
reliability(were(not(as(strong(as(predicted,(these(may(be(explained(by(situational(
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factors(that(contribute(to(varying(levels(of(susceptibility(across(different(scenarios.(
Findings(from(Study(3(regarding(the(cognitive(factors(that(are(predictive(of(
susceptibility(were(partially(replicated(in(Study(7,(where(a(more(realistic(measure(of(
susceptibility(was(employed(–(thus(supporting(the(validity(of(the(email(task,(
suggesting(that(susceptibility(is(being(measured(in(the(same(way(as(response(
likelihood(during(the(office(simulation.((
Secondly,(the(office(simulation(study(designed(for(Study(7(provides(an(
alternative(measure(of(susceptibility.(Using(this(task,(participants(remained(naïve(to(
the(purpose(of(the(research,(allowing(for(a(more(naturalistic(measure(of(response(
likelihood.(Although(less(extensively(tested(through(the(thesis,(this(task(provides(a(
valuable(complementary(measure,(alongside(the(email(legitimacy(task.(The(lab>based(
nature(of(this(simulation(means(that(the(researcher(still(has(experimental(control(
over(stimuli(and(situational(factors(that(might(affect(susceptibility(though.(This(
provides(advantages(for(experimental(control,(which(are(not(available(with(methods(
such(as(a(simulated(phishing(attack.(With(integration(of(new(stimuli(to(keep(these(
measures(up(to(date(with(the(latest(techniques(used(in(phishing(attacks,(it(is(hoped(
that(they(can(be(utilised,(or(provide(a(basis(for(methodologies(employed(in(further(
research(in(this(field.((
(
9.7.3%Additional%contributions.(As(well(as(addressing(theoretical(and(
methodological(issues(surrounding(email(fraud(susceptibility,(this(thesis(aimed(to(
consider(the(applied(implications(of(the(findings(to(real(world(victimisation(and(
possible(ways(to(reduce(this.(Efforts(to(educate(users(to>date(have(been(fairly(
restricted(to(awareness(and(identifying(cues(that(might(indicate(the(illegitimacy(of(an(
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email((e.g.(Sheng(et(al.,(2007;(Kumaraguru(et(al.,(2010).(Whilst(such(programmes(
have(been(shown(to(induce(some(short>term(improvements(in(cyber(security(
behaviour((Abawajy,(2014),(there(is(no(evidence(that(these(have(long>term(benefits(
for(users.(The(findings(from(this(thesis(demonstrate(the(importance(of(incorporating(
human(factors(into(efforts(to(reduce(susceptibility,(based(on(individual(differences(in(
the(decision>making(process(surrounding(email(management.(By(incorporating(
psychological(perspectives(on(cognitive(differences,(as(well(as(the(influence(of(
situational(factors,(training(programmes(could(be(developed(that(are(tailored(to(the(
user(and(inform(them(about(when(and(why(they(might(be(more(at(risk(to(
victimisation.(These(ideas(will(be(discussed(more(in(section(9.9.((
(
9.8%Limitations%of%the%research%
( Whilst(there(are(a(number(of(valuable(insights(generated(from(the(studies(in(
this(thesis,(there(are(also(some(methodological(limitations(that(should(be(taken(into(
consideration(when(contemplating(these.(Due(to(ethical(restrictions,(the(email(
legitimacy(task(was(developed(as(a(lab>based(measure(of(susceptibility(that(assessed(
how(well(participants(could(differentiate(between(phishing(and(legitimate(email(
stimuli(presented(to(them.(With(variations(across(the(experiments,(this(methodology(
allowed(for(a(controlled(assessment(of(email(management(behaviour,(without(the(
need(to(obtain(information(from(participants(deceptively((for(example,(gathering(
email(addresses(for(a(simulated(phishing(attack)(or(requiring(any(violation(of(their(
personal(email(accounts.(However,(the(nature(of(this(forced>choice(judgment(task(
means(that(it(is(not(necessarily(representative(of(real(world(email(management(
behaviour.(When(identifying(the(emails,(participants(are(explicitly(told(that(they(will(
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differentiate(between(phishing(and(legitimate(emails,(thus(resulting(in(them(actively(
seeking(out(clues(to(legitimacy.(Evidence(from(Parsons(et(al.((2013)(demonstrated(
that(explicit(knowledge(of(the(nature(of(this(type(of(task(led(to(improved(accuracy,(
demonstrating(that(participants(do(respond(differently,(with(more(vigilance,(when(
they(are(actively(seeking(to(recognise(phishing.((This(might(be(a(beneficial(approach(
to(take(in(real(life,(but(it(is(unlikely(to(be(how(most(users(approach(day>to>day(email(
management.((
Although(an(effort(was(made(to(give(participants(enough(context(in(the(
instructions(for(the(email(task(to(enable(them(to(complete(the(task,(findings(from(
Study(5((in(which(participants(were(asked(to(think(aloud(about(their(decisions(during(
the(task)(highlighted(the(issue(of(not(knowing(whether(each(email(was(relevant(to(
the(recipient.(For(example,(many(participants(noted(that(they(would(only(believe(an(
email(from(Amazon(confirming(an(order(if(they(knew(they(had(just(ordered(the(
specified(item.(In(future(versions(of(the(email(task,(it(might(be(beneficial(to(provide(
context(with(each(email,(giving(information(about(the(scenario(in(which(the(email(
was(received(and(the(recipient’s(prior(interactions(with(the(company(that(the(email(
purported(to(come(from.(This(would(go(some(way(to(addressing(the(issue(of(whether(
each(email(was(relevant(to(the(recipient.((
A(further(limitation(of(this(task(is(the(lack(of(personal(involvement(with(the(
email(stimuli,(meaning(that(participants(may(not(take(the(decisions(as(seriously(as(
they(would(if(they(were(managing(their(own(emails,(given(that(there(is(no(actual(
threat(of(loss(for(them.(In(order(to(address(this,(a(cash(prize(for(the(best(
performance(in(the(email(task(was(offered(to(participants,(to(encourage(participants(
to(make(an(effort(in(recognising(both(phishing(and(legitimate(emails.(Whilst(this(
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cannot(replicate(a(monetary(threat(to(participants’(own(personal(accounts,(it(
provides(an(experimental(incentive(that(goes(some(way(to(mimic(real(world(email(
management.(Finally,(the(line>up(nature(of(this(task(means(that(participants(may(
compare(cues(between(emails,(giving(them(additional(information(to(base(their(
judgments(on,(which(would(not(be(available(to(them(when(they(were(making(a(
decision(about(a(personal(email.(The(findings(from(Study(4(imply(that(this(may(be(the(
case,(as(accuracy(decreased(when(participants(saw(either(more(phishing(or(more(
legitimate(email(stimuli,(indicating(that(any(comparisons(they(were(drawing(on(the(
basis(that(they(were(viewing(equal(amounts(of(each(were(impairing(judgments.(((
( In(order(to(address(some(of(the(issues(highlighted,(the(office(simulation(study(
was(developed.(During(this(task,(participants(were(naïve(to(the(purpose(of(the(
research,(and(so(their(judgments(about(emails(they(were(managing(were(not(
affected(by(an(objective(to(spot(phishing(emails.(Therefore,(this(was(intended(to(
provide(a(more(ecologically(valid(assessment(of(email(management(behaviour.(The(
partial(replication(of(findings(between(this(and(Study(3(suggests(that(both(are(
measuring(susceptibility(in(the(same(way,(which(supports(the(use(of(the(email(task(as(
a(less(time(consuming,(and(more(easily(administered(measure(in(a(lab>based(
environment.((
However,(there(are(still(a(number(of(methodological(limitations(to(the(office(
simulation.(Although(participants(were(encouraged(to(get(into(character(as(much(as(
possible,(and(were(set(up(in(an(office>like(environment,(there(was(still(no(monetary(
threat(to(them(personally(at(the(end(of(the(day.(This(means(that,(as(with(the(email(
legitimacy(task,(participants(may(not(have(felt(that(they(were(taking(risks(in(choosing(
to(respond(to(an(email,(as(there(is(nothing(at(stake(for(them(compared(to(if(a(similar(
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email(had(been(received(to(their(personal(email(account.(Further(to(this,(this(study(is(
still(lab>based,(and(although(this(allows(for(control(over(the(situational(variables(
being(measured(in(the(study,(it(may(inflict(the(same(biases(as(other(lab>based(tasks.(
For(example,(the(presence(of(a(video(camera(in(the(room(may(induce(the(Hawthorne(
Effect,(disrupting(participants’(natural(behaviour(through(increased(awareness(of(
being(observed((Blum(&(Naylor,(1968).((
( The(most(valid(assessment(of(email(management(behaviour(would(be(to(
observe(response(likelihood(in(users’(actual(inboxes,(either(through(a(simulated(
phishing(attack(or(through(monitoring(of(their(computer,(with(permission.(However,(
each(of(these(methods(raises(ethical(concerns(relating(to(consent(and(the(
embarrassment(caused(to(participants(if(they(decided(to(respond(to(a(phishing,(or(
simulated(phishing(attack.(Further(to(this,(assessment(of(actual(susceptibility(would(
require(participants(entering(personal(information,(to(demonstrate(that(they(would(
engage(with(the(email(to(the(extent(of(victimisation.(Again,(the(ethical(constraints(
surrounding(this(assessment(make(it(difficult(to(use(in(practise((discussed(in(more(
detail(by(Jones,(Towse,(&(Race,(2015).(Therefore,(the(tasks(used(in(this(thesis(provide(
valuable,(ethically(sound,(alternatives(that(provide(insight(into(how(well(users(
recognise(phishing(emails(and(the(cues(they(rely(on(to(make(these(decisions.((
( (The(exploratory(nature(of(investigating(cognitive(influences(on(susceptibility(
meant(that(it(was(necessary(to(include(a(range(of(measures(in(the(initial(
experiments,(as(there(was(little(previous(literature(to(suggest(what(factors(might(be(
important.(However,(the(down(side(of(this(is(that(there(is(an(increased(chance(of(an(
over(fitted(regression(model(–(with(cognitive(variables(found(to(be(predictive(due(to(
noise(generated(by(the(high(number(of(predictor(variables(included((Harrell,(2001;(
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Babyak,(2004).(In(Study(3,(the(cognitive(variables(were(split(into(two(sets,(with(each(
participant(completing(only(one(of(these.(This(means(that(the(number(of(variables(in(
each(model(was(reduced,(so(it(is(hoped(that(this(also(reduced(the(likelihood(of(over(
fitting.(Only(the(predictive(variables(from(Study(3(were(then(included(in(Study(7,(
which(meant(the(number(of(predictor(variables(was(reduced(to(four,(which(again(
should(have(reduced(the(likelihood(of(an(over(fitting(model.((
It(is(important(to(note(that(although(there(was(some(level(of(consistency(
between(studies(in(the(cognitive(variables(found(to(be(predictive,(there(was(also(
consistency(in(the(low(predictive(power(of(these(findings.(It(is(apparent(that(the(
cognitive(variables(discussed,(as(well(as(the(situational(factors(outlined(only(provide(
a(partial(explanation(of(susceptibility.(Nonetheless,(these(are(valuable(insights(that(
contribute(to(a(wider(picture(of(why(some(users(become(victims(of(a(specific(
phishing(email(whilst(thousands(do(not.(These(findings(will(encourage(further(
research(to(provide(a(more(robust(model(of(susceptibility,(to(which(individual(
differences(in(cognitive(make>up,(and(situational(factors(will(contribute.((
( Finally,(it(should(be(acknowledged(that(the(majority(of(data(collected(in(this(
thesis(came(from(undergraduate(students,(meaning(the(age(range(of(the(sample(is(
limited(to(younger(internet(users.(Studies(2(and(2a(provide(a(valuable(data(set(from(
students(and(their(parents(at(a(University(open(day,(giving(a(wider(demographic.(
However,(the(later(studies(rely(on(a(sample(of(limited(demographic.(Study(2a(
demonstrated(a(higher(likelihood(of(past(response(behaviour(in(the(parent(than(the(
student(age(groups,(but(age(was(not(found(to(predict(accuracy(when(judging(the(
small(set(of(email(stimuli(presented(to(participants.(This(may(be(because(the(younger(
age(sample(in(this(study(had(less(exposure(to(email(communications,(and(thus(had(
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less(opportunity(to(fall(victim,(rather(than(lower(susceptibility.(The(student(age(group(
does(provide(a(relevant(sample(group(though,(as(they(are(often(subject(to(targeted(
attacks(relating(to(issues(such(as(student(loans(or(University(account(security.(
Although(further(research(would(be(necessary(to(establish(how(the(findings(reported(
in(this(thesis(relate(to(a(wider(demographic,(findings(relating(to(this(limited(age(
group(provide(valuable(insight(into(this(at(risk(population.((
Further(research(would(be(necessary(to(establish(whether(patterns(found(in(
Studies(3>7(using(lab>based(measures(of(susceptibility(with(a(sample(of(younger(
internet(users,(are(mirrored(in(other(demographic(groups.(If(this(were(the(case,(then(
any(educational(efforts(developed(from(the(findings(in(this(research(would(be(
relevant(to(all(internet(users.(It(is(possible(though(that(the(individual(differences(in(
cognitive(ability(may(vary(between(age(groups,(with(older(subjects(often(finding(it(
harder(to(divide(attention((Kok,(2000)(and(demonstrating(lower(inhibition((Hasher(&(
Zacks,(1988;(Hillman(et(al.,(2006).(This(would(require(alternative(approaches(to(
consider(how(educational(efforts(might(be(tailored(to(reduce(susceptibility(in(these(
cases.(Therefore,(without(further(understanding(of(how(our(findings(generalise(to(
the(wider(internet(population,(it(should(be(concluded(than(any(outcomes(reported(
from(this(thesis(are(relevant(only(to(the(student(sample(at(this(stage.(
(
9.9%Future%directions%
9.9.1%Development%of%methodology.%The(methodological(issues(
highlighted(above(outline(the(need(to(compare(findings(with(a(more(valid(measure(of(
susceptibility(to(email(fraud(in(order(to(demonstrate(the(relevance(of(these(to(real(
world(email(management(behaviour.(The(ultimate(measure(of(susceptibility(is(to(
!! 258!
conduct(a(simulated(phishing(attack(in(which(participants(would(be(required(to(enter(
personal(information(–(demonstrating(their(actual(likelihood(of(becoming(a(victim(of(
fraud.(The(ethical(constraints(of(conducting(such(an(attack(mean(that(this(is(not(
always(practical(though,(unless(there(is(assurance(that(the(personal(information(
entered(by(participants(would(not(be(stored(anywhere.(As(an(interim(measure,(a(
simulated(phishing(attack(where(likelihood(to(click(a(link(or(download(a(file(would(
provide(a(more(valid(measure(than(the(email(legitimacy(task,(but(unfortunately(this(
was(not(possible(in(the(scope(of(this(thesis.(%
In(terms(of(addressing(the(ethical(issues(and(measuring(likelihood(to(actually(
enter(personal(details,(one(possible(alternative(is(to(conduct(research(with(past(
victims(of(email(fraud.(Although(there(are(issues(with(this,(relating(to(the(self>report(
of(circumstances(surrounding(victimisation(and(obtaining(a(comparable(control(
sample,(as(discussed(in(Chapter(1.(Past(victims(are(users(who(have(previously(
demonstrated(susceptibility,(and(so(their(status(is(clear,(given(past(behaviour.(As(part(
of(the(thesis,(a(study(working(with(past(victims(was(designed(but(unfortunately(this(
was(not(executed(due(to(practical(issues(in(obtaining(the(victim(sample.(This(would(
be(an(avenue(to(consider(in(future(research(though.(This(would(also(provide(the(
opportunity(to(assess(the(validity(of(the(email(legitimacy(task(–(by(assessing(how(well(
past(victims(perform(on(this.(This(would(require(comparison(to(a(control(group(
though,(which(might(be(difficult(to(obtain,(as(this(would(need(to(be(a(group(of(users(
who(have(been(exposed(to(the(same(types(of(emails(as(the(victims(but(not(have(
fallen(victim.(Otherwise,(it(may(be(argued(that(the(control(group(could(be(just(as(
susceptible(but(have(never(been(under(circumstances(that(led(them(to(become(
victims(of(fraud.((
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9.9.2%Theoretical%implications.%Development(of(the(most(valid(measure(of(
susceptibility(that(is(practically(and(ethically(feasible(will(establish(whether(findings(
related(to(the(cognitive(make>up(of(the(user(reported(here(are(replicable.(With(
consistent(replication(of(findings(regarding(inhibition,(and(the(effect(of(cognitive(load(
on(susceptibility,(a(more(conclusive(model(of(response(likelihood(could(be(
generated.(With(a(thorough(understanding(of(individual(differences(>(building(upon(
initial(findings(reported(in(this(thesis,(considering(the(application(of(dual>system(
theories(of(decision>making(and(the(effects(of(divided(attention(>(efforts(to(reduce(
susceptibility(can(be(tailored(accordingly.((
(
9.9.3%Applications%of%research%findings.%As(well(as(developing(the(most(
reliable(and(valid(measure(of(susceptibility(to(encourage(further(research(into(
individual(differences(in(susceptibility,(it(is(also(important(that(efforts(are(made(to(
apply(findings(into(educational(efforts(to(reduce(susceptibility.(Research(from(
computer(science(has(demonstrated(how(successful(different(techniques(for(training(
users(about(cues(to(phishing(emails(are,(with(interactive(games(proving(the(most(
beneficial((Sheng(et(al.,(2007;(Abawajy,(2012).(However,(the(effectiveness(of(these(
training(techniques(is(often(only(measured(on(a(short>term(basis,(meaning(the(long>
term(benefits(of(such(programmes(remain(unknown.((
Evidence(from(Studies(1(and(5(suggests(that(participants(are(reliant(on(cues(
that(are(often(out>dated(or(do(not(address(the(more(sophisticated(nature(of(
techniques(employed(by(some(fraudsters.(Further(to(this,(Study(7(demonstrated(that(
simply(warning(participants(about(the(presence(of(phishing(emails(in(a(computer(
system(did(not(reduce(their(likelihood(to(respond.(In(order(to(provide(long>term(
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protection(from(email(fraud(victimisation,(it(is(important(to(do(more(than(warn(users(
of(the(existence(of(phishing(and(teach(them(about(the(cues(to(look(out(for,(which(are(
constantly(changing(with(the(advancement(of(technological(approaches(to(phishing.(
Users(have(demonstrated(an(inability(to(apply(knowledge(to(unfamiliar(security(
scenarios((Downs(et(al.,(2006).(Therefore,(it(might(be(beneficial(to(tailor(educational(
efforts(towards(teaching(users(about(how(phishing(attacks(are(conducted,(what(the(
fraudsters(are(attempting(to(gain(from(them,(and(how(situational(factors(might(put(
them(at(higher(risk.(Further(to(this,(including(assessments(of(cognitive(reflection(in(
training(programmes(could(allow(personalised(feedback(to(users(about(potentially(
heightened(susceptibility,(based(on(the(findings(from(the(thesis.((
Additional(research(looking(at(the(long>term(effects(of(such(educational(
programmes(would(allow(for(assessment(of(their(success.(By(using(lab>based(
measures(of(susceptibility,(this(could(be(assessed(both(before(and(after(the(
implementation(of(the(programme,(in(addition(to(periodical(assessments(over(an(
extended(period(of(time(to(ensure(that(participants(are(still(aware(of(how(to(protect(
themselves,(regardless(of(technological(advances(on(the(part(of(the(fraudsters.(
(
9.10%Conclusions%
( In(a(novel(area(of(research(to(the(field(of(psychology,(this(thesis(provides(an(
exploratory(step(towards(understanding(how(users(become(victims(of(email(fraud.(
By(considering(both(individual(differences(and(external(influences,(the(studies(
reported(outline(key(considerations(for(future(efforts(to(protect(users(against(
victimisation.(Incorporating(mixed(methods(for(assessing(susceptibility(also(
contributes(to(the(field,(with(the(development(of(two(tasks(that(can(hopefully(be(
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used(in(future(research.(Though(there(is(still(vast(scope(for(further(research(in(this(
area,(especially(in(the(development(of(tools(to(protect(users,(the(research(from(this(
thesis(provides(insight(into(the(question(of(why(thousands(of(users(can(receive(the(
same(email,(and(yet(only(a(small(proportion(will(respond(to(it.((!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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